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INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "the Act") was enacted in
1990 with the express purpose of "providing a 'clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
. Associate Director, National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School where he is
an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law. B.A., cure laude, Marquette University, 1991; J.D., Marquette
University Law School, 1995. Professor Anderson is the Editor of the Journal of Legal Aspects of
Sport published by the Society for the Study of the Legal Aspects of Sport and Physical Activity, and
the Supervisor of the Marquette Sports Law Review published by Marquette University Law School.
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disabilities."'" This elimination of discrimination has touched virtually every
comer of American life. Whereas disabled individuals previously might have
been ignored or merely omitted from consideration, the ADA's clear mandate
has forced these individuals to the forefront of public consciousness.
Perhaps no area of American life has been more scrutinized by the strictures
of the ADA than sports. Growing out of cases under the Rehabilitation Act,
2
disabled athletes have fought their exclusion from sports participation at virtually
every level of competition.
No case has garnered more public attention, and more decisive opinions than
Casey Martin's suit against the PGA Tour. During the years it took the case to
reach the Supreme Court, individuals in the sports world-from commentators to
the athletes themselves-worried that a victory for this disabled athlete would
spell the end of elite athletics as we know them today. While the result in the
case may have surprised some, the sports world has not seen the shocking results
anticipated by some commentators.
In his essay on Casey Martin in the last issue of this publication, Brian
Shannon explained the results of the case in detail from the perspective of one
closely involved in the litigation.3 Shannon's analysis, however, similar to many
critiques of the Martin case, leaves the impression that the case exists in a
vacuum as if the sports world has not faced critiques under the ADA for some
time. This is not an omission; it is merely a focus that is not part of the analysis
for many.
In 1999 this author attempted to present a comprehensive analysis of the
ADA's impact on the sports world by looking at the many sports cases that had
addressed the issue up until the time of the first decision in Martin by the Oregon
district court.4 Now that the Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue, it is
worthwhile to analyze the cases that may have led to its conclusion. This Article
attempts to fill in the gap by analyzing what has occurred since 1999.
Beginning with a brief introduction to the ADA, the Article will analyze the
Julia Kasperski, Disabled High School Athletes and the Right to Participate: Are Age Waivers
Reasonable Modifications Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 49
Baylor L. Rev. 175, 182 (1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994)).
' Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
3 Brian Shannon, A Drive to Justice: The Supreme Court's Decision in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, I
Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 54 (2001). In fact, Shannon's dedication to Martin's case is a perfect outgrowth
of his own personal situation-his own daughter has the same Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome that
afflicts Casey Martin. This personal stake does not cloud Shannon's perspective, however, as he
presents a cogent legal analysis of the Supreme Court's case leading to the logical conclusion that the
Court's decision was correct.
4 Paul M. Anderson, Spoiling a Good Walk: Does the ADA Change the Rules of Sport?, I Va. J.
Sports& L. 44 (1999).
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many cases that have dealt with claims by disabled athletes seeking to participate
in different levels of sport. This analysis will use these cases to explain the true
impact of the ADA and the Martin case on the sports world. An initial study of
the cases that came down in the two years before the Supreme Court's Martin
decision will demonstrate that the Supreme Court's decision merely followed in
the footsteps of prior judicial analysis of the impact of the ADA on the sports
world. This leads into a look at the actual dispute the Supreme Court resolved in
the Martin case-the Ninth and Seventh Circuit's differing opinions in Olinger
and Martin. These cases lead to a discussion of the Supreme Court's Martin
decision with a specific focus on how the decision may actually affect the sports
world beyond Casey Martin. As part of this discussion, several cases that have
followed the Supreme Court's reasoning will be analyzed to demonstrate how
lower courts have interpreted the decision. Finally, the actual impact of the
Martin case on disabled athletes will be assessed.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ADA
Many commentators and courts have discussed the provisions of the ADA in
depth-a recitation of these provisions is not necessary here.5 Moreover, in the
sports context, Title II and Title III have been the provisions found applicable.
Title I, which applies only to employment situations, has not been the focus and
will not be discussed herein.6
Cases involving sports at the interscholastic level and, less frequently, at the
intercollegiate level have dealt with claims under Title II. Title II provides that
no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity.7
Title II only applies to such "public entities" that discriminate against "qualified
individual[s] with a disability.. .who, with or without reasonable modifications
to rules policies, or practices... meet[ ] the essential eligibility requirements for
5 For further details, see, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Law of Disability Discrimination: Cases and Materials
(3d ed. 2000); Anderson, supra note 4, at 46-51.
6 Although Title I has not been the focus of the case law, it does have some impact as "Title I of the
ADA requires that organizations employing over 15 individuals comply with the ADA. Thus, the
ADA has applied to professional leagues from its enactment and disabled professional athletes such as
Tom Dempsey (NFL), Jim Abbott (MLB), and Magic Johnson (NBA) have all played in the major
leagues without having sought protection provided them under the ADA." Anita M. Moorman & Lisa
Pike Masteralexis, Writing an Amicus Curiae Brief to the United States Supreme Court, PGA Tour,
Inc. v. Martin: The Role of the Disability Sport Community in Interpreting the Americans with
Disabilities Act, II J. Legal Aspects of Sport 285, 310 (2001).
' 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1995).
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receipt of the services or participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity."
As Title II has mostly been used in sports cases dealing with student-
athletes, these claimants must show that (1) the athletic association or school is a
"public entity," (2) the student-athlete is a "qualified individual with a
disability," (3) the student-athlete has been excluded from participation in or
denied the benefits of the activities of the association or school, and (4) the
association or school could make "reasonable accommodations/modifications"
that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the activities or benefits of the
association.
9
Potential liability under Title III has been the issue in many other cases at the
intercollegiate and professional level. Title III provides that
[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.'
Title III prohibits many types of discrimination against disabled individuals
based on their disabled status. The most common prohibitions involved in the
sports cases include denial of participation,11 screening of individuals with
disabilities from enjoyment of the goods and services of the place of public
accommodation, 12 and failure to make reasonable accommodations unless such
accommodations would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods and services
of the place of public accommodation. 13
II. APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO SPORTS
Since its inception, the ADA has been applied to the sports world in many
different ways. In 1999, this author catalogued these cases up until the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Martin.14 After this decision the courts have not been silent.
Many have addressed the ADA's impact on the sports world even as the United
States Supreme Court listened to arguments in the Martin case. As the district
court noted in Martin, "[t]he ADA does not distinguish between sports
9 Id. § 12131(2).
9 Kasperski, supra note 1, at 182-84.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2001).
''Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
12 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
13 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
14 Anderson, supra note 4, at 51-75.
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organizations or other entities when considering whether its provisions apply."
1 5
In order to assess this impact and gain a true understanding how the Martin case
and the ADA may affect the sports world, a brief analysis of these cases is still
important.
In an attempt to synthesize the results of the cases in the most organized
manner, they will be discussed under three categories: (1) interscholastic sports,
(2) intercollegiate sports, and (3) sports facilities.
16
A. Interscholastic Sports
Cases at the interscholastic level of sports participation (mainly high school)
deal with claims brought by disabled student athletes who argue that they were
barred from participating in a particular sport as a direct result of their disability.
These cases often involve eight-semester rules, which bar participation in school-
sponsored athletics after the eighth semester from the time a student originally
enrolled, or age limitations, which bar the participation of students who reach a
certain age, usually those who are older than eighteen years of age. In essence,
"[d]isabled athletes are denied from participation in athletics by these rules
because their disability has forced them to take longer in school to meet
academic or other requirements. '" As a result, they are in school for more than
eight semesters or are too old to participate in school-sponsored athletics.
In such a case, disabled students will often sue the high school organization
enforcing the rule that keeps them from participating in athletics. Normally they
ask for a waiver from the rules as an accommodation mandated by the ADA.
Until 1999, the cases in the interscholastic sports area reached inconsistent
results. The United States Courts of Appeal for the Sixth i8 and Eighth' 9 Circuits
determined that the ADA does not mandate that interscholastic athletic
associations modify age limitation rules because such changes would be
unreasonable modifications of essential rules. In reaching contrary results, the
Second20 and Eleventh 2' Circuits made their decisions based on the mootness of
the claims themselves and not on the actual merits of the claim brought.
Although the recent cases in this area have not resolved the issue, it is
15 Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Or. 1998).
16 All of the cases discussed in this Section were decided after January 1, 1999. For an overview of the
cases before this point, see Anderson, supra note 4, at 51-75.
1d. at 52.
McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997); Sandison v. Mich.
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
'9 Potgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
2' Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996).
21 Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 102 F.3d 1172 (11 th Cir. 1997).
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helpful to analyze them to develop a full picture of the issue at the interscholastic
level.22
1. Bingham v. Oregon School Activities Association
2 3
When Adam Bingham was in the sixth grade, a physician diagnosed him as
having a learning disability-Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD"). Bingham
began high school in 1994, but he did not play interscholastic sports as a
freshman. The next year he participated in sports and his family, teachers, and
physician believed that he benefited academically from that participation. Still,
due to concerns over his overall academic progress, Bingham was held back a
grade to repeat his sophomore year of high school. Moreover, in order to avoid
any perceived social stigma associated with repeating a grade, Bingham's
parents decided that he would transfer to another school for the 1996-97 school
year. At this new school, Bingham played football and wrestled.
In 1997, Bingham's family moved and he enrolled at a third school for his
junior year. He played football and wrestled at this school as well. At this point
he had played sports for six semesters, although he had been enrolled in high
school for eight semesters overall. Bingham's current school was initially
unaware of his participation record
Eventually the school counselor, athletic director, and Bingham's father met
because of an Oregon School Activities Association ("OSAA") rule that limited
a student's athletic eligibility to eight consecutive semesters of high school-
regardless of whether the student actually participated in athletics during those
22 Another case, Inskip v. Astoria School District lIJ, 1999 WL 373792 (D. Or. 1999), will not be
discussed in depth here as it merely dealt with a motion for a preliminary injunction. In this case,-the
School District refused to allow the plaintiffto play softball. Due to the plaintiffs autism, the District
felt that she posed a danger to herself and others. Plaintiff sued the District under Title II of the ADA
asking for a preliminary injunction stopping the District from barring her participation. As the court
explained, and the District agreed, plaintiff is disabled and was excluded from participation solely
because of her disability. The District argued that because of the danger she posed to other
participants, she was not an "otherwise qualified individual," and they did not have to accommodate
her wish to play sports.
While the court admitted that "[niotwithstanding a disabled student-athlete's ability to perform the
skills necessary for a particular sport, a significant risk of personal physical injury can disqualify the
student from a position if the risk cannot be eliminated," id. at *2, the District did not make a showing
that plaintiff or any other players would face a reasonable probability of substantial injury by plaintiff
playing softball. The court also determined that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if she was not
allowed to play sports. As a result, the court determined that the plaintiff had a likelihood to succeed
in proving she was a "qualified individual" and granted her motion for a preliminary injunction,
meaning that the District could no longer exclude her from practice or games as a result of her
disability. Id. at *2.
23 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Or. 1999).
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eight semesters. Everyone acknowledged that athletics provided Bingham with
motivation to stay in school and encouraged his academic progress. The
counselor suggested that Bingham be tested for an Individualized Education
Program ("IEP") under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA").24 Even though Bingham qualified for an IEP, and the OSAA had
special procedures that allowed for waivers from its rules for students with an
IEP, Bingham was not given a waiver from the eight-semester rule.
Subsequently, Bingham sued the OSAA under the ADA, claiming that its refusal
to give him a waiver of the rule violated the Act.
According to the court, Bingham needed to prove four elements in order to
prevail on his ADA claim. Initially, Bingham needed to prove that the ADA
applied to the OSAA. As the court explained, the OSAA "acts pursuant to a
delegation of authority from the school district boards as well as the State Board
of Education," and therefore, it is a public entity covered by Title II of the
ADA.
25
As with other cases dealing with learning disabled student-athletes, the court
easily found that plaintiff was a disabled individual as required under the ADA
because "in the context of pursuing his education through the high school
level ... [he] is substantially limited in the major life activity of learning. 26
The court combined the last two elements in its analysis of whether Bingham
was a qualified individual with a disability and whether waiver of the eight-
semester rule constituted a reasonable modification under the ADA to
accommodate his disability. The OSAA put forth four justifications for the rule:
(1) to ensure safety, (2) to promote competitive fairness, (3) to encourage
students to graduate in four years, and (4) to ensure that all students have an
equal opportunity to participate in athletics and that no student receives a greater
opportunity at the expense of another student.
27
Before determining whether the eight-semester rule was an essential rule or
whether it could be reasonably modified in this case, the court looked at several
other OSAA eligibility rules (minimum attendance and grades and age
limitation), noting that the OSAA expressly provided for waivers of these rules
for learning disabled students, while not allowing for similar waivers from the
eight-semester rule. 28  The court could not reconcile these differences.
Specifically it noted that a similarly disabled student who is nineteen years of
24 20 U.S.C. §§1401-1491 (1997).
25 Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
26 Id. at 1196.
27 Id.
2
1 ld. at 1196-97.
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age could be given a waiver from the age limitation rule (barring participation in
athletics to students over the age of eighteen), even though this student would
present the same safety and competitive fairness concerns. Moreover, such a
student could displace another student on the team, and thus implicate the
specific purpose behind the eight-semester rule.29 The OSAA had also waived
the rule for many other reasons (such as drug abuse problems, broken homes,
and emotional disorders), because athletic participation motivated these students
to pull themselves out of their problems and eventually graduate.30 This was
exactly the motivation that Bingham received from his athletic participation.
The OSAA pointed to the Sixth Circuit's ruling in McPherson v. Michigan
High School Athletic Association,31 arguing that requiring it to consider a
student's disabled status in a waiver request would impose an immense burden
on it and so would be unreasonable. The court found McPherson both
distinguishable and unpersuasive.32
Initially, the Bingham court noted that unlike McPherson, the OSAA already
considered a student's disabled status in granting waivers of the other eligibility
rules, so this burden on the OSAA seemed nebulous. 33 Also, the McPherson
case relied on a "parade of horribles" argument, claiming that such an
individualized assessment of a disabled student would lead to an increase in
overall assessments and tax the administrative body, here the OSAA.34 The
Bingham court again disagreed with the McPherson court and instead noted that
the fact "[t]hat there may be few or many qualified individuals with a disability
is irrelevant to the reasonableness of a modification. 35
In the end, the court could not find that the eight-semester rule was an
essential rule. Instead it found that "a waiver of the eight-semester rule under the
circumstances of [Bingham's] case is a reasonable modification to accommodate
his learning disability. 36 Therefore the court ordered the OSAA to refrain from
using the eight-semester rule to deny Bingham eligibility to participate in sports
in 1998-99 and to rewrite the eight-semester rule to allow waivers for learning
disabled students.37
29 Id. at 1201.
30 Id. at 1202.
" 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
32 Bingham, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1203
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1202.
" Id. at 1205-06. This was not the end of the Bingham decision, although the subsequent
adjudications did not affect the result of the case. In August 1999, the court defined the procedures for
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2. Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Association
38
Eric Washington was a learning disabled student at Central Catholic High
School in Lafayette, Indiana. Despite his long history of academic problems, he
was allowed to advance to high school. During Washington's freshman year in
high school (1996-97), a school counselor suggested that he drop out because he
was having severe difficulty with his schoolwork. 9
In the summer of 1997, Washington was playing in a three-on-three-
basketball tournament when Central Catholic coach, Chad Dunwoody, noticed
his outstanding ability. Dunwoody, who was also a schoolteacher, convinced
Washington to reenroll at Central Catholic. 40 Dunwoody began serving as
Washington's academic counselor and suggested that Washington be tested for
learning disabilities even though prior tests failed to indicate any disabilities.
Results of new tests indicated that Washington did have a learning disability.
4 1
The Indiana High School Athletic Association ("IHSAA") had a rule
limiting athletic eligibility to eight semesters following the student's
commencement of the ninth grade.42 This rule was implemented to discourage
coaches from red-shirting their players and to promote competitive equality and
student safety. Washington applied for a waiver of the eight-semester rule under
an exception providing that the eight-semester rule can be waived if a student
withdraws completely from school due to an injury and receives no academic
credit during that time.43 Washington also relied on a hardship rule allowing the
IHSAA to avoid strict construction of its bylaws if such enforcement would
promote undue hardship in a particular case.44 The IHSAA denied Washington's
45
request for a waiver.
Washington then filed suit against the IHSAA alleging violations of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. The district court granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the rule against Washington,
judicial review of decisions under the OSAA's new eight-semester rule, adopted after the initial case.
Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D. Or. 1999). The case was also appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit determined that the
issue was moot because Bingham had completed high school, and therefore it vacated the district
court's injunction. Bingham v. Ediger, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21808 (9th Cir. 2001)_
s 181 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1999).
3 Id. at 842.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 842-43.
44 Id. at 843.
45 Id.
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finding that waiver of the rule "would be a reasonable modification because
there would be no conflict with the purposes behind the eight semester rule.'
6
The IHSAA's primary goal is to enhance education through athletic
participation. The court ruled that failing to accommodate Washington would
contravene this goal.47 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed this decision and held that the potential harm to the IHSAA
48
would be insignificant if this rule was waived for Washington.
The court of appeals focused on whether the IHSAA rendered Washington
ineligible to play solely because of his disability. 49  Initially, the IHSAA
contended that Washington could not show that the IHSAA had intentionally
barred him from participation because of his disability. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed that liability under Title II of the ADA must be premised by an intent
to discriminate as the IHSAA contested. 50 Instead the court looked to the
McPherson51 case and focused on whether the IHSAA had failed to provide
Washington with a reasonable modification. 52 The court held that "it is possible
to demonstrate discrimination on the basis of disability by a defendant's refusal
to make a reasonable accommodation... plaintiffs need not prove that the
IHSAA intended to discriminate on the basis of disability." 53
The IHSAA also relied on the Sixth Circuit's McPherson and Sandison
54
decisions upholding similar eight-semester rules that barred disabled athletes and
holding that they did not violate the ADA because the students were really
barred by the passage of time and not the nature of the disability.55 The Seventh
Circuit in Washington found that the Sixth Circuit's determinations merely
indicated that the application of a neutral rule that makes a disabled student
ineligible cannot support'a claim of intentional discrimination; the Sixth Circuit,
however, never indicated that the passage of time was somehow the legal cause
of the ineligibility. 56 In the present case, "[i]n the absence of his disability, the
passage of time would not have made him ineligible.,
5 7
The Seventh Circuit then analyzed whether Washington was a "qualified
46 Id. at 844.
47 Id.
" Id. at 853-54.
49 Id. at 846.
SId at 846.
5' McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997).
52 Washington, 181 F.3d at 847.
I d. at 848.
54 Sandison v. Mich. High Seh. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
" Washington, 181 F.3d at 848-49.
56 Id. at 849.
57 Id
220
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individual" covered by Title 11 and, therefore, whether waiver of the rule would
fundamentally alter the purpose of the rule or create an undue financial and
administrative burden on the IHSAA. The court noted the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Pottgen,58 holding that even if a waiver would be reasonable in a
particular case, it would not be required if the rule was generally an essential
eligibility requirement. 59 Instead of following this decision, the Seventh Circuit
looked to the dissent in Pottgen and the McPherson case, which found that an
individualized analysis of the particular case is necessary to determine whether
waiver of the rule would result in an unreasonable fundamental change.6 °
The court then turned to an individualized examination of Washington's
claim. The court noted that the eight-semester rule that the Sixth Circuit refused
to waive in McPherson was different from the rule in the Washington case,
because it restricted eligibility to eight semesters of enrollment, while the
IHSAA rules automatically created ineligibility eight semesters from the first
day of enrollment even if the student was not enrolled for the full eight
semesters. As the court explained, the IHSAA granted waivers of the rule in the
past, and none of the purposes behind the rule would be violated by giving
Washington a waiver in this case. 61  In addition, Washington was the first
individual to seek a waiver of the rule because of a disability in over a decade; in
other words, granting Washington a waiver would create no administrative
burden.
62
In the end, because the granting of a waiver for Washington would frustrate
no purpose of the rule itself, it was deemed a reasonable modification of the rule
as mandated by the ADA. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision granting Washington a waiver of the eight-semester rule.
63
3. Stearns v. Board of Education for Warren Township High School District #121 '
In another case dealing with a challenge to an interscholastic eligibility rule,
Rickey Higgins was barred from participating in athletics after two alcohol-
related incidents that violated his high school's Athletic Code of Conduct.
65
Soon after, Higgins was diagnosed as an alcoholic. 66 His parents informed the
58 Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994).
" Washington, 181 F.3d at 850 (citing Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 929).
60 Washington, 181 F.3d at 850 (citing Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931; McPherson, 119 F.3d at 461, 463).
"' Washington, 181 F.3d at 852.
61 Id. at 852.
63 Id. at 853-54.
1999 U.S. Dist, LEXIS 17981 (N.D. I11. Nov. 16, 1999).
6
Id. at 2 3.
66 Id. at *3.
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school of this diagnosis and asked for his eligibility to be restored, but the school
board would not take this action. 67 Higgins's mother, Elizabeth Steams, then
sued the Board of Education alleging that their actions violated the ADA.68
The court allowed for the presumption that Higgins was disabled and
otherwise qualified, but still found that the Board's conduct did not violate the
ADA.69 As the court explained, the Board was unaware of his diagnosis as an
alcoholic-his alleged disability-when they made the decision that he was
ineligible. Therefore, they could not have made the decision as a result of his
disability.70
The plaintiffs argued that knowledge of an individual's disabled status is not
a prerequisite to liability under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act; instead liability
can be imposed on defendants merely if the decision was based on the
manifestation of some sort of disability. In response, the court pointed to a
Seventh Circuit decision in the employment context which stated that there
should be no liability when the organization "had no knowledge of the disability,
but knew of the disability's effects, far removed from the disability itself and
with no obvious link to the disability," and found the plaintiffs' argument
unpersuasive.71
The plaintiffs also argued that the Board's failure to accommodate Higgins's
alcoholism was in violation of the ADA. Pointing to the Washington case,
however, the court noted that "[a] waiver of a rule is unreasonable if it is 'so at
odds with the purposes behind the rule that it would be a fundamental and
unreasonable change.' 72 Granting Higgins a waiver from the code would create
a double standard and would "eviscerate the rule itself."73 The waiver would
fundamentally alter the rule and thwart its stated purposes; thus, it would be an
unreasonable accommodation.
In the end, the court noted "[f]ederal courts must be hesitant to interfere in [a
school's] operation absent a clear violation of law or the Constitution., 74 The
allegations in this case could not meet this standard.
67 Id.
68 Id. at * I.
69 Id. at *5-6.
70 Id. at *6.
71 Id. at *6-7, (quoting Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 933-34 (7th Cir. 1995)).
72 Stearns, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17981, at *10 (quoting Washington, 181 F.3d at 850).
73 Stearns, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17981, at *10
74 Id. at *11.
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4. Long v. Board of Education, District 12875
A final case which occurred after the Martin decision chronologically, but
fits in this initial analysis of the interscholastic level of sports participation,
involved Matthew Long, a student who was denied the opportunity to participate
in lacrosse and football because he violated the school's athletic code of conduct,
allegedly due to a disability. Long sued the Board of Education seeking a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") that would permit him to participate in
athletics. Although the court did not address the facts of the case in any depth,
the ruling resembles that in the Stearns case just discussed.
Initially, in assessing Long's likelihood of success on the merits of the case,
the court noted two possible ways that the Board could have violated the ADA.
The Board would be in violation of the ADA if it knew of his disability and
excluded him from participation or if it failed to provide a reasonable
accommodation after determining his disabled status.76 As to any potential
reasonable accommodation, the court, following the Stearns77 and Washington7'
cases, found that "waiver of the application of the code of conduct to plaintiff
would be, in the words of the Stearns court, an 'unreasonable change,"' because
it would alter the fundamental nature of the rule itself.79
Even assuming that Long did have some likelihood of success, the court also
determined that granting a TRO would send a message to others that an athletic
code of conduct may be avoided by simply bringing an ADA challenge against
the association instituting the code.80 The court was uncomfortable in replacing
the Board's authority to set its own rules with whatever a federal court might
decide. As a result, Long's motion for a temporary restraining order was
denied.81
5. Impact of the Interscholastic Cases
The cases at the interscholastic level all deal with claims against public
schools or athletic associations covered under Title II of the ADA. As with the
earlier cases,8 2 the issue has focused on whether modification of a particular
eligibility rule will findamentally alter the nature of the sports program offered.
75 167 F. Supp. 2d 988 (N.D. I11. 2001).
76 Id. at 991.
77 See supra Section II.A.3.
78 See supra Section II.A.2.
:9 Id.; see supra note 72.
SO Id. at 992.
:
1 Id. at 992-93.
82 Anderson, supra note 4, at 51-58.
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The Bingham8 3 and Washington84 courts focused on an individualized analysis of
the student-athlete claimants' situations, finding that waiver of the eligibility
rules involved was a reasonable modification that would not fundamentally alter
the nature of the sports program offered. The Stearns8 5 and Long86 courts came
to different results because they found that waiver of the rules would result in a
fundamental alteration.
It is this individualized analysis of how a potential modification requested by
a particular claimant may affect the sports program itself that will be eventually
drawn upon in the Martin case. Clearly, as the factual circumstances in each
case will differ, the final results of these cases were necessarily different-all
that seems uniform is the analysis of the ADA itself.
Moreover, these interscholastic cases are not only directly related to the
intercollegiate cases that follow; they also are closely related to the Martin case
itself. As one court noted, the consideration of whether an individual has been
discriminated against on the basis of his or her disability under Title III is
analogous to the consideration of whether an individual was a qualified
individual with a disability under Title 11.87 These cases analyzing rules for
eligibility that control participation in sports are therefore very similar to the
cases assessing actual participation in sports.
Finally, it is interesting to keep in mind that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which decided the Washington case based on an
individualized assessment of the particular claimant, was the court that was made
a decision causing a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Martin-
both cases will be discussed in this Article."8
B. Intercollegiate Sports
At the intercollegiate level, the issue is much the same. Students who were
held back or took special education courses as a result of their disability in high
school often cannot meet the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements to
participate in college athletics during their freshman year. Then, "[a]s these
student-athletes could not meet NCAA initial eligibility requirements (i.e., they
took courses that were necessitated by their disability although not recognized as
fulfilling the core requirements of the NCAA), these student-athletes allege that
83 See supra Section II.A.2.
8 See supra Section II.A. 1.
85 See supra Section II.A.3.
86 See supra Section II.A.4.
87 Bowers v. NCAA, 118 F. Supp. 2d 494, 517 (D.N.J. 2000) [hereinafter Bowers I1].
8& See supra Part IIl.
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the NCAA's declaring them ineligible is a violation of the disability laws."
89
Until 1999, although three courts determined that the NCAA is amenable to
suit under Title III of the ADA, 90 no higher court had determined that the NCAA
could be held liable under the ADA. In fact, each case simply dealt with motions
brought by the various parties; no final adjudication of the merits of the issue had
occurred. Since that time, the NCAA has faced further legal challenges under
the ADA, often in litigation that has continued for several years.
1. Butler v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
91
In 1996, Toure Butler was granted a preliminary injunction forbidding the
NCAA from enforcing its initial eligibility requirements to bar him from
participation in college athletics. In making this determination, the court found
that Butler had at least some probability of success in proving that the NCAA
was an operator of a place of public accommodation for purposes of Title III of
the ADA. 92
Before the matter could go to trial, the NCAA entered into a consent decree
under which it agreed to abide by the requirements of the ADA, although
steadfastly denying that it was actually amenable to the ADA.93 Subsequently,
Butler and the NCAA agreed that the action should be dismissed (although there
has been further litigation involving the payment of attorney's fees). 94 Although
the Ninth Circuit recognized the United States Department of Justice's finding
that the NCAA violated Title III of the ADA, 95 the precedential value of the
initial Butler decision that found the NCAA potentially amenable to the ADA is
now certainly lessened.
2. Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Association9
Anthony Matthews was a learning-disabled student-athlete at Washington
State University ("WSU"). To accommodate Matthews's disability, the NCAA
39 Anderson, supra note 4, at 59.
90 Ganden v. NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368, at *33-34 (N.D. I11. Nov. 19, 1996); Butler v.
NCAA, Order Issuing Preliminary Injunction, No. C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233 (W.D. Wash. Nov.
8, 1996); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 483-89 (D.N.J. 1998) [hereinafter Bowers 11].
91 Butler v. NCAA, Order Issuing Preliminary Injunction, No. C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 1996).
'2 Id. at *5-.
93 United States v. NCAA, Consent Decree (D.D.C. May 26, 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.govtcrtfada/ncaa.htm (last visited Mar. 1,2002).
9' Butler v. NCAA, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (W.D. Wash. 1999), rev'd and remanded, No. 99-36187, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 1044 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2001).
95 Butler v. NCAA, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1044, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2001).
96 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (E.D. Wash. 1999) [hereinafter Matthews !].
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granted him two waivers under its "75/25 Rule," enabling him to compete on
WSU's football team during the 1997 season and be red-shirted for the 1998
season. The 75/25 Rule, as established by NCAA Bylaw 14.4.3.1.3, is one of the
NCAA's minimum academic requirements. The rule provides that all student-
athletes must earn at least 75 percent of the minimum number of credit hours
required to maintain full-time student status. 97  The rule further states that
student-athletes cannot earn more than 25 percent of the required number of
credit hours during the summer session.98 The purpose of the 75/25 Rule is to
keep each student-athlete's workload on par with that of the general student
body. Because summer school classes tend to be less demanding than regular
academic year classes, the rule forbids student-athletes from making up credits
by taking less rigorous summer courses.
Matthews completed seven credits during the fall 1998 semester and nine
during both the spring and summer 1999 semesters. These credits comprised
only 64% of the required course load for the regular academic year.
Consequently, when Matthews applied for a third waiver, the Satisfactory
Progress Waiver Committee of the NCAA denied it because his academic
performance had not improved despite the two previous waivers. After the
NCAA did not respond to his request that it reconsider the decision, Matthews
sued the NCAA claiming that its conduct violated Title III of the ADA which
prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation.
Initially, the court issued a TRO against the NCAA, enjoining it from
declaring Matthews to be academically ineligible and thus prohibiting him from
participating in intercollegiate athletics.99 In the present case, the court
considered Matthews's application for a preliminary injunction.
In analyzing Matthews' ADA claim, the court noted that "[flew courts have
considered actions by the NCAA in light of the ADA, and those that have
generally have not directly addressed the question of whether the ADA applies to
the NCAA."100 The court specifically pointed to Tatum v. NCAA,,l ' which held
that the ADA applies to the NCAA because the extensive control it exerts over
the athletic facilities of its member institutions rendered it an operator of those
facilities. 10 2 The district court found that the Tatum court's reliance upon certain
17 National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2001-2002 NCAA Division I Manual (Michael V. Earle,
ed., 2001), available at http://www.ncaa.org/librarylmemberhip/divisioni-manual/2001-02/Al4.pdf
(last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
98 Id
99 Matthews I, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.
tl Id. at 1204.
"' 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
102 Matthews 1, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (citing Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1120).
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facts in making this determination was incorrect.
10 3
The NCAA argued that because its organization was not an actual physical
"place," it was not a place of public accommodation in the most traditional
sense, and thus could not be bound by regulations under Title 11.1 04 The court
pointed to other sports cases where courts ruled that a hockey membership
organization, 105 an organization sponsoring a bicycle race, 10 6 and the National
Football League 0 7 were not places of public accommodation. Consequently, the
Matthews court held that the NCAA was not a place of public accommodation
for purposes of Title Illl.'
Still, the NCAA could have been amenable to Title III as an operator of a
place of public accommodation. The court made clear that "a facility being a
place of public accommodation does not mean that Defendants are operators of
that public accommodation merely because events sanctioned by them occur
there,"'0 9 especially when the NCAA has "no direct control over any of the
facilities used by member institutions."'" 0 As a result, the court determined that
the NCAA "simply do[es] not fall within the scope of the ADA."'
'II
In addition, the court reiterated that the NCAA had already granted
Matthews two waivers of its academic requirements, and that Matthews
nevertheless could not possibly satisfy the 75-25 rule. Requiring the NCAA to
perpetually issue waivers for him would undermine the purpose of establishing
requirements; the ADA would not mandate such a policy."
2
After this case, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court,
however, decided to wait until the United States Supreme Court's resolution of
Martin before addressing these motions." 3 The later disposition of this case will
be discussed further on in this Article.
3. Cole v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
114
Plaintiff Quinton Cole, a learning-disabled football player at the University
of Memphis, did not meet the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements when
"'3 Matthews I, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
104 Id.
lOS Ellin v. USA Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217,223 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
116 Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496, 499 (N.D. ttl. 1997).
107 Stoutenborough v. NFL, 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995).
108 Matthews 1, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
109 Id. at 1205-06.
" oId. at 1206.
11d.
12 Id. at 1207.
11 "Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1214 (E.D. Wash. 2001) [hereinafter Matthews 11].
114 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
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entering college and thus did not qualify for Division I competition.
Subsequently he applied for a waiver pursuant to the NCAA Bylaws, but the
NCAA's Waiver Subcommittee determined that it lacked sufficient information
to find that his academic record warranted a waiver. Plaintiff appealed this
decision, having informed the NCAA that his academic deficiencies were a
result of his disabled status. Plaintiff also filed suit against the NCAA, claiming
that its policies violated Title III of the ADA and seeking an injunction against
the enforcement of these rules.1
15
The NCAA again denied plaintiffs appeal for a waiver. The court also
denied plaintiffs request for a temporary restraining order and scheduled a
hearing on his motion for injunctive relief. Prior to the hearing, the NCAA
contacted Cole and suggested that he resubmit his application for a waiver. He
complied and included new information that led the NCAA to declare him to be
a partial qualifier.' 
16
Although the court determined that plaintiff's partial qualifier status
rendered his claim moot,"17 its discussion of the ADA and its impact on the
NCAA is still important. While the court would not reach a conclusion
concerning the applicability of Title III to Cole, it nevertheless invoked the
Eighth Circuit's ruling in Pottgen, which held that "the ADA does not require an
institution to 'lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to
accommodate a handicapped person.'....8  Moreover, the court seriously
questioned the reasonableness of accommodations which impose "undue
financial and administrative burdens or ... require a 'fundamental alteration in
the nature of the program."" '19
In analyzing the NCAA's eligibility requirements,' the court reasoned that
such requirements are "essential" or "necessary" if they are "reasonably
necessary to accomplish the purposes of a particular program.' 20 The court also
explained that because the NCAA's initial-eligibility requirements are integral
and essential rules, "[t]he statute 'does not require the NCAA to simply abandon
its eligibility requirements, but only to make reasonable modifications to
them'.' 12 ' The court ultimately concluded that "[albandoning the NCAA's
115 Id. at 1065-6.
"
6 Id. at 1067.
7Id. at 1068.
IS Id. at 1070 (citing Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 931).
"9 Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 US. 273, 287 n.17
(1987)).
120 Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-71.
121 Id. at 1070 (citing Ganden, 1996 U.S. Dist- LEXIS 17368, at *49 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1996)).
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essential eligibility requirements in this case is not a reasonable modification.',
122
In addition, the court hesitated to substitute its judgment for that of the NCAA,
noting that "the NCAA's rules and decisions regarding the concerns and
challenges of student-athletes are entitled to considerable deference," and
expressed its reluctance "to replace the NCAA subcommittee as the decision-
maker on private waiver applications.' 23
4. Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
The Bowers case is one of the most complicated and lengthy cases involving
a learning-disabled student-athlete's claim against the NCAA. In Bowers 1,124
the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that
"a complete abandonment of the 'core course' requirement would fundamentally
alter the nature of the privilege of participation in the NCAA's intercollegiate
athletic program," and therefore would be an unreasonable modification not
warranted under the ADA.1
25
The NCAA then filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs amended complaint.
In the second case, the court initially found that the NCAA could be amenable to
the public accommodation provisions of Title III of the ADA because "Bowers
has adequately alleged that the NCAA owns, leases (or leases to), or operates the
place of public accommodation and that he was denied the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of that place of public accommodation."' 26 According to the
court, the issue boiled down to whether the NCAA "manages, controls, or
regulates the place or places of public accommodation," in a way that somehow
discriminatorily denied Bowers the enjoyment of the public accommodation. 27
The court found that there was more than sufficient evidence that the NCAA is
an "operator" of a place of public accommodation in that its eligibility rules and
leasing and operating of public accommodations constitute the kind of conduct
that falls under the statute. 28 Furthermore, it determined that the NCAA's
waiver process and other accommodations might not be enough to be considered
reasonable and sufficient under the ADA. 129 The court would not judge the
merits of Bowers's claim seeking a modification of the NCAA's rules tied to his
122 Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
23 Id. at 1071-72.
124 Bowers v. NCAA, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997) [hereinafter Bowers 1].
z Id. at 467.
126 Bowers 1I, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 479-80.
127 Id. at 486.
12' Id. at 486-87.
"29 Id. at 476.
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particular situation and allowed the case to proceed to trial.
30
The case came back to the district court for a third time in November
2000.1' This lengthy opinion covered many different claims, but for purposes of
this analysis, only those parts of the case dealing with the merits of Bowers's
ADA Title III claim against the NCAA will be discussed.
The court began its analysis by assessing whether the NCAA is an owner,
lessor, or operator of a place of public accommodation. In Bowers I, the court
had determined that the NCAA is not a place of public accommodation itself, but
it could be considered an operator of such a place of public accommodation.,
32
The Bowers III court then allowed the NCAA to introduce new evidence
showing that such a conclusion would be incorrect. According to the court, the
NCAA failed to present any such evidence, and the court held "as a matter or
[sic] law, that the NCAA is an operator of a place of public accommodation
under Title 111." 133 The court also pointed to the Ganden,'34 Butler,'35 Tatum,'36
and Matthews'37 decisions and noted that only the Matthews court concluded that
the NCAA is not an operator for Title III purposes. 138 The court specifically
disagreed with the Matthews decision and held that, as in Tatum, "the NCAA
does more than merely regulate the eligibility of potential college athletes ... the
NCAA is effectively determining the rules and regulations of each member's
athletic facilities."'
' 39
The court then turned to an analysis of whether Bowers was discriminated
against on the basis of his disability. Connecting the high school and college
cases, the court noted that this consideration is analogous to the "otherwise
qualified" and "by reason of" a disability analysis under Title 11.140 In other
words, Bowers needed to demonstrate a causal connection between his disabled
status and the NCAA's alleged discriminatory conduct by either showing that the
eligibility criteria were unnecessary and screened out individuals with
disabilities, or that the NCAA failed to provide him with the requested
reasonable accommodation which would not fundamentally alter the NCAA's
130 Id.
131 Bowers 111, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
132 Bowers 11, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 488-89.
133 Bowers III, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 515.
134 Ganden v. NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1996).
135 Butler v. NCAA, Order Issuing Preliminary Injunction, No. C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 1996).
136 Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
137 Matthews 1, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
138 Id.
"9 Id. at 516-17.
140 Id. at 517.
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operation.
Initially, the court determined that the NCAA had not provided sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the core course requirement is essential or that it
does not tend to screen out individuals with disabilities. 41 It was still an open
question, however, whether Bowers was discriminated against by the
implementation of "unnecessary eligibility criteria that screen out individuals
with disabilities. 1 42
The court next moved to an analysis of whether Bowers could meet these
requirements if he was given a reasonable accommodation. The NCAA could
still argue that such an accommodation is not warranted because it would
fundamentally alter the requirement itself. Because the NCAA had not carried
its burden of demonstrating that the requirements are essential, the court could
not reach a conclusion as to the requirement's fundamental nature, and thus
could not hold that Bowers's proposed modification would fundamentally alter
the NCAA's eligibility program. 43
The NCAA argued that the waiver procedure that Bowers used was a
sufficient accommodation to his disabled status. As the court explained,
"[w]hether an accommodation is reasonable 'involves a fact-specific, case-by-
case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the
modification in light of the nature of the disability in question."" 44 Moreover,
the focus is not on the reasonableness of the modification in some general sense;
the focus is on "what is reasonable given the specific facts of Bowers's
circumstances.'
145
The court was not persuaded by Bowers's arguments that the waiver process
began too quickly, that he had no knowledge of the process before entering
college, and that the members of the Waiver Subcommittee were unqualified.
4 6
It did, however, conclude that the waiver process occurred too late to be effective
for Bowers because by the time the process began, it was too late for him to
receive any scholarship money and participate in athletics during his freshman
year.1 47 Therefore the court found that "the waiver review process that the
NCAA conducted for Bowers... was not a reasonable accommodation as
required under Title III of the ADA."' 4"
141 Id. at 519-19.
141 Id. at 519.
143 Id. at 520.
1" Id. at 521 (citing Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995)).
143 Id.
14 Id. at 521-23.
147 Id. at 523-24.
141 Id. at 524.
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The case returned to court in February 2001 for a fourth time. 149 This case
involved the NCAA's motion for reargument because it had changed its rules
and so argued that Bowers could not be given injunctive relief as he is not
suffering from any continuing and present adverse affects of his initial eligibility
status, because under the new rules Bowers is able to receive a fourth year of
eligibility. The court held that his claim based on the year he was ineligible was
no longer valid. Therefore, Bowers no longer had standing to seek injunctive
relief because he has now been placed in the same position (able to participate
for four years) as he would have been had he been an initial qualifier. The
NCAA's motion was granted.150
5. Impact of the Intercollegiate Cases
At the intercollegiate level, courts have addressed claims by disabled
individuals arguing that the NCAA's eligibility requirements discriminate
against them as a result of their disabled status. Similar to the Martin case, these
claims focus on potential liability under Title III of the ADA. The courts have
focused on two main issues: (1) whether the NCAA's eligibility requirements are
essential such that their modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the
NCAA's operations, and (2) whether the NCAA itself is covered by Title III as a
place of public accommodation.
As to the first issue, the Matthews and Cole courts determined that the
NCAA's rules are essential and that their modification would fundamentally
alter the NCAA's requirements, while the Bowers XI1 court did not feel that the
NCAA carried its burden of proving that these rules were essential.
As to the second issue, while the Matthews court found that the NCAA itself
is not a place of public accommodation covered under Title III, the Bowers III
court specifically disagreed with Matthews and found that the NCAA is a place
of public accommodation covered by Title III.
Based on these decisions, the issue of whether a sport association like the
NCAA is subject to Title III is still unclear. However, these courts, most
significantly in Bowers 111, also undertook the type of individualized assessment
of the student-athlete's claims as was seen in the interscholastic cases. Again, it
is this individualized assessment that was eventually important in the Martin
case itself.
49 Bowers v. NCAA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610 (D.N.J. 2001) [hereinafter Bowers IV].
'50 Id. at 614. The case returned to court a fifth time in August 2001. This case involved the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination and not the ADA, so its resolution is not pertinent to this
discussion. Bowers v. NCAA, 151 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D.N.J. 2001) [hereinafter Bowers V].
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C. Sports Facilities
One of the most fertile areas in sports for litigation involving the ADA has
been in the area of sports facilities. Typically these cases focus on access to or
use of the facility itself by disabled patrons and not in any way on eligibility or
participation issues concerning the athletes themselves."' Therefore, in the
overall analysis of participation by disabled athletes in sports, these cases are
only peripherally important and will not be discussed in depth herein.
Ill. CASEY MARTIN AND FORD OLINGER
From the beginning of the dispute, Casey Martin's plight has been
intertwined with that of Ford Olinger. Both are exceptional golfers who have
serious disabilities that affect their ability to walk and both sued one of golf's
governing bodies claiming that they should be allowed to use a golf cart in
competition. 152  Although the courts reached different results, the appellate
decisions involving these golfers essentially focused on the same two issues. It
is the court's disagreement in these cases that lead to the Supreme Court's final
resolution of the issue.
A. Place of Public Accommodation
Both cases were brought under Title III of the ADA. As such, the initial
consideration for each court was whether the USGA or PGA Tour was a place of
public accommodation covered under the statute.
After the district court held that the PGA is subject to the ADA and must
provide Casey Martin with the use of a cart as a reasonable accommodation to
his disability, the PGA Tour appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.153 In focusing on the issue of whether the PGA Tour is a place
of public accommodation covered by Title III, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
Tour's argument that although Title III specifically covers a golf course, the
competitor's area behind the ropes during a PGA event is not a place of public
accommodation.
Initially, the court pointed to the intercollegiate cases discussed and noted
151 Recent cases in this area include Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Centre at the
Waterfront, 193 F.3d 730 (3rd Cir. 1999); Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000),
affd without opinion, 213 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2000); Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters Inc., 2001 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21065 (9th Cir. 2001); Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 142 F.
Supp. 2d 1293 (D.Or. 2001); Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D.
Fla. 2001).
152 For an in-depth discussion of initial decisions involving Olinger and Martin, see Anderson, supra
note 4, at 75-86, and Shannon, supra note 3, at 75-80.
153 Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000).
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that "the underlying premise of the cases dealing with disabled student athletes is
that Title III applies to the playing field, not just the stands."' 5 4 Therefore, the
fact that access to some part of a golf course or other playing field may be
limited during competition "does not deprive the facility of its character as a
public accommodation."'
' 55
The PGA Tour also argued that because its tournaments are restricted to the
best golfers, they cannot be considered open to the public, at least during the
competitions themselves. As the Ninth Circuit explained, however,"the fact that
users of a facility are highly selected does not mean that the facility cannot be a
public accommodation."'' 56 In fact, any member of the public who pays a $3,000
entry fee and supplies two letters of recommendation can try out for qualifying
school-the first step to participation on the PGA Tour. Although eventually
only the highest qualified golfers reach the elite level of the PGA Tour, the court
found "no justification in reason or in the statute to draw a line beyond which the
performance of athletes becomes so excellent that a competition restricted to
their level deprives its situs of the character of a public accommodation."
'157
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that golf courses remain places of
public accommodation during PGA Tour tournaments.1
58
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit came to a much
different conclusion. Initially, the district court granted Ford Olinger a
temporary restraining order, allowing him to use a cart in the qualifying stages
for the 1998 U.S. Open as an accommodation of his disabled status. 159 Even
with this accommodation, Olinger was unable to qualify for the Open.
Thereafter, following a trial, the district court agreed with the USGA and denied
Olinger's further use of a cart in competition.' 60 Olinger then appealed the
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.'
6
In a decision rendered the day after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Martin,' 62
the Seventh Circuit initially addressed the USGA's argument, similar to the PGA
14 Martin, 204 F.3d at 998 (citing Bowers 11, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 483-90); Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp.
1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Ganden v. NCAA, 1996 WL 860000, at *8-11 (N.D I11. Nov. 19, 1996).
' Martin, 204 F.3d at 997.
156 Id. at 998.
157 Id. at 999.
158 Id.
159 Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, Case No. 3:98CV252RM, at 3 (N.D. Ind. May 15 & 18, 1999);
Anderson, supra note 4, at 84-86.
16 Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
161 Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir.), petition for reh'g & reh'g en bane
denied, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14464 (2000).
162 The Ninth Circuit filed its decision on March 6, 2000, while the Seventh Circuit filed its decision
on March 7, 2000.
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Tour, that the courses used for its competitions are subject to the ADA outside
the actual areas of the competition where the general public has access, but not
subject to the ADA within the competition areas. 163 The Seventh Circuit would
not resolve this issue as it believed that the case could be resolved on a much
narrower issue-the nature of the requested accommodation itself.'
64
An analysis of the courts' determinations in regard to this issue is now
necessary.
B. Reasonable Accommodation
In addressing the reasonableness of Casey Martin's request to use a cart
during competition as an accommodation to his disabled status, the Ninth Circuit
framed the issue as simply "whether the accommodation... fundamentally alters
the PGA and Nike Tour competitions. 165 The PGA Tour argued that allowing
Martin to use a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of its competition,
because walking is an essential part of the game of golf at the PGA level and
Martin's use of a cart would provide him with a competitive advantage over
other golfers. Observing that the official rules of golf do not require players to
walk, the court recognized that "walking is not essential to the generalized game
of golf"' 66 It also noted that the use of a cart by Martin is reasonable not only
because it solves the problem of his access to the competition, but also because
carts are already used in various PGA Tour-sponsored competitions already.
167
Similar to the interscholastic and intercollegiate cases already discussed, the
Ninth Circuit also focused on an individualized analysis of whether Martin's use
of a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA Tour's competition.
The district court found that the fatigue factor injected into the game of golf by
walking was not significant and that when given the choice most players chose to
walk instead of using a cart."'6 The district court also held that even with a cart,
Martin endures greater fatigue than other able-bodied golfers; he gains no
competitive advantage from the use of a cart.169 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the district court and found that "[a]ll that the cart does is permit Martin access to
163 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004-05.
"4 Id. at 1005.
165 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000.
'6 Id. at 999.
167 Id.
16s Id. at 1000 (citing Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250-51 (D. Or. 1998)). For an
interesting study of the actual potential fatigue factor associated with walking during a round of golf,
see John M. Kras & Brian T. Larsen, A Comparison of the Health Benefits of Walking and Riding
During a Round of Golf, 6 Int'l Sports J_ 112 (2002).
169 Martin, 204 F.3d at 1000.
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a type of competition in which he otherwise could not engage because of his
disability. That is precisely the purpose of the ADA."17
Following the Sandison, McPherson, and Pottgen cases that determined that
it would be an undue burden for high schools to assess whether an
accommodation to a student athlete's disability- leads to a competitive advantage,
the PGA Tour also argued it would be an, undue burden for it to undertake a
similar individualized inquiry to determine whether any disabled individuals
using carts would have an advantage over other competitors. The Ninth Circuit
pointed out that the decisions in these cases were based on each court's finding
that the eligibility rules involved were essential because they protected
competition at the lower age group and pre~'ented redshirting. 71  The
aforementioned decisions were premised on concerns about creating undue
administrative burdens; this was not the case in the golf context, as the court
found the fatigue factor to be insignificant.
17 2
The Ninth Circuit also made clear that it did not "share the antagonism to
individual determinations reflected in these cases.' 73 Instead, finding support
from the Seventh Circuit's decision in Washington, it found that "the inquiry
must focus on the individual exception. .. in light of the plaintiffs
individualized characteristics,' ' 74 and that "[n]othing in the record establishes
that an individualized determination would impose an intolerable burden on
PGA."' 175 Therefore, in analyzing Martin's individualized situation, use of a cart
was a reasonable accommodation that did not fundamentally alter the nature of
PGA Tour competition.
As stated earlier, the Seventh Circuit found in Olinger that it could resolve
Olinger's entire claim based on an analysis of the reasonableness of allowing
him to use a cart as an accommodation to his disability. The court also pointed
to Sandison and Pottgen, but it used those cases in support of the rule that "the
ADA does not require entities to change their basic nature, character, or purpose,
in so far as that purpose is rational, rather than a pretext for discrimination."
'176
The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the nature of the
competition would be fundamentally altered "if the walking rule were eliminated
because it would 'remove stamina ... from the set of qualities designed to be
170 Id.
1711Id. at 100 1
7' Id. at 1002.
173 Id.:'
174 Id. (emphasis in original).
175 Id.
176 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005.
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tested"' in USGA competition.
177
The court found the testimony of Ken Venturi very persuasive. Venturi is a
retired highly successful golfer and a golf analyst for CBS Sports. Venturi
recounted the 1964 U.S. Open that was played in temperatures near 100 degrees
with 97 percent humidity. Battling dehydration and against doctors' orders,
Venturi completed and won the tournament on the verge of collapse. According
to Venturi, if another competitor had been allowed to ride a cart, "there would
have been a 'tremendous advantage to the other player."" 178  Venturi also
recounted Ben Hogan's win at the 1950 U.S. Open after a severe car accident led
doctors to tell him that he would never walk again. Although the Seventh Circuit
admitted that Olinger's disability is more dire than Hogan's situation in 1950, to
the court it "emphasizes the importance and tradition of walking in
championship-level tournament golf competition."'
' 79
The Seventh Circuit also agreed with the district court's determination that it
would be an administrative burden to ask the USGA to develop a system to
evaluate whether requests for waivers were from applicants that were truly
disabled and deserving or merely from those wanting to use a cart. The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that this would be an unnecessary burden
for the USGA to undertake. 80
In the end, the Seventh Circuit held that "the decision on whether the rules
of the game should be adjusted to accommodate ... [a disabled individual] is
best left to those who hold the future of golf in trust."18' The court would not
force the USGA to alter its rules to accommodate Ford Olinger.
Many commentators have debated whether the Ninth or the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning is correct.1 2 Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court
has provided the ultimate answer with its ruling in the Casey Martin dispute.
177 Id. at 1006.
179 Id.
179 Id. at 1007.
190 Id.
181 Id.
182 See, e.g., Stephen J. Lautz, A Good Walk Spoiled: The ADA's Intrusion into Professional
Athletics, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 238 (2000); Michael Waterstone, Let's Be Reasonable Here: Why
the ADA Will Not Ruin Professional Sports, 2000 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1489 (2000); Laura F. Rothstein,
Don't Roll in My Parade: The Impact of Sports and Entertainment Cases on Public Awareness and
Understanding of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 Rev. Litig. 399 (2000); Brian Pollock, Case
Note and Comment: The Supreme Court Appeal of the Casey Martin Case: The Court's Two
Options-Martin's Hole-in-One or Olinger's Slice Into the Bunker, 10 J. Art & Ent. L. 391 (2000).
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IV. PGA TOUR, INC. V. CASEYMARTIN
183
In order to understand how the Supreme Court has clarified the way in
which the ADA can and may affect the sports world, a brief description of the
case itself is necessary.
A. The Decision
On appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court distilled
the case down to two major issues: (1) whether the ADA protects access to the
PGA Tour's tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability, and (2) whether
a disabled contestant may be denied the use of a golf cart as a modification
because such use would fundamentally alter the nature of the tournament
itself.
18 4
In resolving these issues, the Court first addressed whether walking is
actually a rule of golf so that the use of a cart is specifically prohibited. The
Court looked to the Rules of Golf jointly written by the USGA and the Royal and
Ancient Golf Club of Scotland and found that they do not prohibit the use of golf
carts. The Court also noted that the "Conditions of Competition and Local
Rules" allow for participants to use a cart during qualifying rounds and that the
Senior Tour allows contestants to use golf carts. Finally, the "Notices to
Competitors" or hardcards for particular events often allow for the use of a cart
to speed up play. All in all, there are many times when a participant is allowed
to use a golf cart in a PGA Tour event.
Early on, the Court also noted that Casey Martin's disability, Klippel-
Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, causes him specific problems when walking.
According to the Court, "[w]alking not only cause[s] him pain, fatigue, and
anxiety, but also create[s] a significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood
clots, and fracturing his tibia so badly that an amputation might be required." '185
In order to participate in a PGA Tour event, Martin must be able to use a cart.
Still, at trial, the PGA Tour insisted that walking during a PGA tournament is a
substantive rule of competition, and that waiving this rule for any individual
would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.
Turning to the substantive issues, the Court found that the PGA Tour's
events fit easily within Title III of the ADA. These events occur on "'golf
courses,' a type of place specifically identified by the Act as a public
accommodation," and at all relevant times the PGA Tour "' leases' and 'operates'
83 121 S.Ct. 1879 (2001).
tId. at 1884.
Isld. at 1885-86.
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golf courses to conduct its Q-School and tours."' 86 As a result, "Title Ill of the
ADA, by its plain terms, prohibits petitioner from denying Martin access to its
tours on the basis of his disability.
' 87
The PGA Tour argued that Title I11 is merely concerned with discrimination
against "clients or customers" seeking to obtain "goods and services" at places of
public accommodation, and so while it may protect spectators viewing a PGA
event, it does not apply to participants "inside the ropes." The Court found this
argument unpersuasive. It pointed out that PGA events offer two potential
benefits or services-"that of watching the golf competition and that of
competing in it."' 88  Therefore, there are two sets of clients or customers:
spectators at the events and actual players in the tournaments. In the end, "[ilt
would be inconsistent with the literal text of the statute as well as its expansive
purpose to read Title III's coverage.., any less broadly."189
Although the Court found that Title lt of the ADA does apply to the PGA
Tour, the Tour could still avoid allowing Martin to use a cart if such a
modification would fundamentally alter the nature of a PGA Tour tournament.
The Court explained that a modification might constitute a fundamental
alteration in two ways: (1) "[i]t might alter such an essential aspect of the game
of golf that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors
equally;"' 90 and (2) "a less significant change that has only a peripheral impact
on the game itself might nevertheless give a disabled player, in addition to access
to the competition as required by Title III, an advantage over others
and ... fundamentally alter the character of the competition."
1 91
In assessing whether the use of a cart would fundamentally alter the nature
of PGA Tour tournament golf, the Court noted that the essence of golf is shot-
making, and thus the "use of carts is not itself inconsistent with the fundamental
character of the game."'192 As one commentator noted,
[g]olf, even PGA-level competition, is not a contest in which speed, mobility,
size, or quickness is essential (in contrast to sports like tennis, soccer, basketball,
football and running). The lowest score wins in PGA events. There is no bonus
reduction of strokes for fast play; no style points for speed or walking form; no
requirement to run between shots; and no penalty for moving up the fairway too
186 Id. at 1890 (citations omitted).
187 Id.
88 Id. at 1892.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 1893. The Court noted that changing the diameter of the hole from three to six inches might
be such a modification.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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slowly (although time limits apply once the ball is reached and before it is struck).
The game is about skilled shot-making, not walking.
93
As already explained, the Rules of Golf do not include a walking rule; the
only place it is included is in the particular event hardcards as an optional
condition-clearly not an essential attribute of the game itself. Moreover, as the
PGA Tour allows carts to be used at Senior Tour events and at certain other PGA
and Nike Tour events, "the walking rule is not an indispensable feature of
tournament golf either."' 94
The PGA Tour argued that the general game of golf is much different than
the game it sponsors, what it referred to as-golf at the "highest level"--a game
that does not allow for a contestant to use a cart. This is because walking injects
a certain fatigue factor into each contestant's game-if one contestant uses a
cart, he will not face this same fatigue and may have a competitive advantage
over other competitors. According to the PGA, this type of competition is only
meaningful if all competitors are subject to the same rules, and a "waiver of any
possibly 'outcome-affecting' rule for a contestant would violate this principle
and therefore ... fundamentally alter the nature of the highest level athletic
event." 195 The Supreme Court did not agree with this argument.
The Court pointed out that there are many circumstances-for example,
weather, green conditions, lucky bounces- that can have as much of an effect
on the outcome of an event as the potential fatigue an individual contestant will
feel as a result of walking the course. In addition, the Court supported the
district court's determination that the fatigue factor from walking during a
tournament "cannot be deemed significant."'196 Finally, when given the option of
using a cart, "the majority of golfers in petitioner's tournaments have chosen to
walk, often to relieve stress or for other strategic reasons."
197
Even assuming that the fatigue factor was significant and potentially
"outcome affecting," the PGA Tour failed "to consider Martin's personal
circumstances in deciding whether to accommodate his disability," and this "runs
counter to the clear language and purpose of the ADA."'98 This is the exact
individualized inquiry mentioned in the discussion of the many sports cases that
have interpreted the ADA's requirements. In reasserting this focus on the
individual and inferentially supporting the analysis in these cases, the Supreme
193 Shannon, supra note 3, at 94.
194 Martin, 121 S.Ct. at 1895.
195 Id.
's Id. at 1896.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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Court stated the test for making this determination, "an individualized inquiry
must be made to determine whether a specific modification for a particular
person's disability would be reasonable under the circumstances as well as
necessary for that person, and yet at the same time not work a fundamental
alteration. '199
Furthermore, answering the PGA's argument that any change in what it
called "outcome affecting" rules would cause a fundamental alteration, the Court
realized that what the Tour was really arguing was that it was exempt from Title
Ill's reasonable modification requirements. As the Court explained, Title Ill
"carves out no exemption for elite athletics, and given Title III's coverage not
only of places of 'exhibition or entertainment' but also of 'golf courses,' its
application to petitioner's tournaments cannot be said to be unintended or
unexpected.
'20 0
Therefore, in making the individual evaluation of Casey Martin, realizing
that in order to participate he must use a cart, the Court held that "allowing
Martin to use a golf cart would not fundamentally alter the nature of [the PGA
Tour's] tournaments." 201  While the purpose of the walking rule is to inject
fatigue, it was undisputed that Martin will endure greater fatigue than an able-
bodied contestant even with the use of a cart. The rule "is not compromised in
the slightest" by allowing Martin to use a cart and this modification to a
"peripheral tournament rule without impairing its purpose cannot be said to
'fundamentally alter' the tournament.,
202
The Supreme Court was also aware that this decision imposes some
administrative burden on operators of places of public accommodation like the
PGA Tour. The Court made clear, however, that these burdens "could be
avoided by strictly adhering to general rules and policies that are entirely fair
with respect to the able-bodied but that may indiscriminately preclude access by
qualified persons with disabilities.
203
199 Id.
2o Id. at 1896-97 (citations omitted)
201 Id. at 1897. As one commentator noted, the decision in Martin "is in sharp contrast to the Olinger
opinion, which endorses maintaining the sport as it has always been played, a process that might
approve the very discrimination by intent or neglect that the ADA is intended to remedy." Alison M.
Barnes, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Aging Athlete After Casey Martin, 12 Marq.
Sports L. Rev. 82 (2001).
Another commentator observed that "[g]iven the substantial fatigue and pain caused by Martin's
disability, he might have asked to be allowed to play only nine of the requisite eighteen holes, then
multiply his score by two. But, that would be a fundamental alteration of the sport his score would
not be based on shot-making over the full course." Shannon, supra note 3, at 92.
202 Martin, 121 S.Ct. at 1897.
203 Id. Concomitant with this decision, the Supreme Court also vacated the Seventh Circuit's decision
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B. Rules and Clarifications
The Supreme Court's decision is a perfect outgrowth of the sports cases
discussed earlier. Specifically, in five areas the Supreme Court clarified exactly
what type of scrutiny is necessary when a disabled individual sues a sports
organization under the ADA.
1. Fundamental Alterations
In assessing claims made by disabled student-athletes, the interscholastic and
intercollegiate athletic cases came to inconsistent results. Several courts
determined that a waiver of eligibility rules would fundamentally alter the nature
of the sports program involved,204 while other courts determined that a waiver
was reasonable because the sports organizations' rules were not essential or
fundamental.205
While discussing this fundamental alteration language, the Supreme Court
delineated a test for future cases to follow. A modification might constitute a
fundamental alteration in two ways: (1) "[i]t might alter such an essential aspect
of the game ... that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors
equally '20 6 and (2) "a less significant change that has only a peripheral impact on
the game itself might nevertheless give a disabled player, in addition to access to
the competition as required by Title I11, an advantage over others
and... fundamentally alter the character of the competition.
207
In following this rule, the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that allowing
Martin to use a cart (1) would not alter an essential aspect of the game of golf-
contrary to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Olinger-because the walking rule
is not an essential or fundamental rule of golf, and (2) Martin's use of a cart did
not give him an advantage over other competitors and as a result it did not
fundamentally alter the competition.
It is with this second point that the Seventh Circuit's decision seems most
in Olinger and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for further proceedings. Olinger v. United
States Golf Ass'n, 121 S.Ct. 2212 (2001), on remand, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20379 (7th Cir. Sept. 4,
2001).
204 See, e.g., Steams v. Bd. of Educ. for Warren Township High Sch. Dist. 4121, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17981, at *10 (N.D. I1. Nov. 16, 1999); Long v. Bd. of Educ. Dist. 128, 167 F. Supp. 2d 988,
991 (N.D. I1. 2001); Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1070 (N.D. Ga. 2000); McPherson v.
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1995); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 960 (8th Cir. 1994).
205 See, e.g., Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202 (D. Or. 1999);
Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840, 852 (7th Cir. 1999).
116 Marlin, 121 S. Ct. at 1893.
207 Id.
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nebulous. If the Seventh Circuit would have undertaken the type of
individualized assessment necessary under the ADA to determine whether
Olinger required a cart, its decision may have been more in line with what the
Supreme Court eventually decided.
In answer to the Supreme Court's decision, many individuals feared that the
sports world would now open itself to modifications of games cherished by the
public to somehow accommodatedisabled individuals. As one commentator
noted, however, "[t]he ADA limits the scope of modifications to those that are
reasonable which do not fundamentally alter the nature of the sport. With that
inherent mechanism in the ADA to limit modifications, the advocates of the
chaotic slippery slope theory need not fear the prospect of motorized wheelchairs
in professional baseball games., 2 1 Moreover, "[w]hat this argument
conveniently ignores is that much of the business of law is about drawing lines.
Judges are paid to do so, and they generally do it well." 209
A recent decision in Florida is illustrative of this point. The case dealt with
wheelchair-bound individuals who requested, in part, that a cruise ship change its
craps tables as an accommodation to their disabled status. In specifically
following the Martin case, the court determined that
[liowering the rail of a craps table or lowering the entire table would alter the
playing surface in a manner that is the equivalent of changing the dimensions of a
playing field or the size of the diameter of a golf hole. Similarly, moving one of
the croupiers or the stickman from his designated spot on the table to another spot
would change the dimensions of where competitors play... Moreover, allowing
disabled players to play from a spot on the table that other players cannot play
from may provide the disabled players with an advantage not enjoyed by the other
players. As Plaintiffs' proposed modifications of the craps tables would
fundamentally alter the nature of the game, Ptaintiffs are entitled to no relief with
respect to the craps tables. 10
2. Individualized Assessments
It is this type of individual assessment of the disabled claimant that is most
outcome-determinative in disability sport cases. Interestingly, although it did not
clearly follow this directive in Olinger, the Seventh Circuit undertook exactly
208 Pollock, supra note 182, at 447-48.
209 Shannon, supra note 3, at 98 (citing Tom D'Agostino, Casey Martin Golf Cart Case About
Fairness; ADA not Con Artist's Tool, Ariz. Republic, Mar. 9, 1998, at B5).
210 Ass'n for Disabled Americans, Inc. v. Concorde Gaming Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1367 (S.D.
Fla. 2001).
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this type of individualized assessment in the Washington case. 211 The court
analyzed the particularized effect that the eight semester rule had on
Washington, and the nature of the proposed modification of the rule-namely, a
waiver-and found that the modification of the rule for Washington was entirely
reasonable. 1 2
The Bowers III court undertook much of the same analysis.2 13 In assessing
whether Bowers's request for a waiver was a reasonable modification of the
NCAA's eligibility rules, the New Jersey district court emphasized "what is
reasonable given the specific facts of Bowers's circumstances," and not on the
reasonableness of the modification in some general sense.214 Afler making this
individualized assessment, this court found that the NCAA's proposed
accommodation in its waiver process was not a reasonable accommodation as
215required under the ADA.
In Martin, the Supreme Court made clear that this individualized assessment
is required under the ADA by stating, "an individualized inquiry must be made
to determine whether a specific modification for a particular person's disability
would be reasonable under the circumstances as well as necessary for that
person, and yet at the same time not work a fundamental alteration."21 6 The
Court pointed to provisions within Titles II and III that specifically require the
elimination of discrimination against "individuals" with disabilities.2 17 After
making this assessment in Martin's case, the court found that his necessary use
of a cart would not alter the nature of PGA Tour competition.
As one commentator noted, "given the requirement of individual assessment,
the standard seems to require identifying an accommodation that is believed to
have the correct effect. If such a determination can be made, it must be made,
not only when it is 'easy."'
21t
3 Undue Burden
The PGA Tour and many of the sports organization defendants argued that
any sort of process where they are forced to undertake an individualized
assessment of potentially qualified, although disabled, individuals who seek to
211 Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 1999).
212 Id. at 852-54.
213 Bowers III, 118 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D.N.J. 2000).
214 Id. at 521.
215 Id. at 524.
216 Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1896.
217 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(1), 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994)).
2I8 Barnes, supra note 201, at 83.
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participate would be unduly burdensome and not required by the ADA.
21 9
This assertion of undue burden was also a major part of the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Olinger. Pointing to the district court with approval, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the USGA would have to "develop a system and a
fund of expertise to determine whether a given applicant truly needs, or merely
wants, or could use but does not need, to ride a cart to compete; '220 this was an
administrative burden that the Seventh Circuit did not believe the ADA would
221impose.
The Supreme Court admitted that the ADA "imposes some administrative
burdens on the operators of places of public accommodation;" it made clear,
however, that this is acceptable because
Congress intended that an entity like the PGA not only give individualized
attention to the handful of requests that it might receive from talented but disabled
athletes for a modification or waiver of a rule to allow them access to the
competition, but also carefully weigh the purpose, as well as the letter, of the rule
before determining that no accommodation would be tolerable.
222
In a footnote, the Supreme Court also determined that the PGA Tour's
contention about this undue burden was overstated. In the three years since
Martin began his suit, no other golfer had sued the PGA, and only two others had
sued the USGA. 23 Moreover, as the Court stated, nowhere in the ADA "does
Congress limit the reasonable modification requirement only to requests that are
easy to evaluate."
224
The Bingham court seems to share this finding as it noted that the fact "[lt]hat
there may be few or many qualified individuals with a disability is irrelevant to
the reasonableness of a modification., 2 5 In the end as one commentator adds
"given that entities such as private colleges, medical, nursing, and law schools,
and medical, nursing, and legal examining boards, make such individualized
inquiries every day in matters that arguably have far more societal impact than
does professional golf, the PGA's complaint rings hollow.
' 226
219 See, e.g., Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1070 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (noting "accommodations
are not reasonable if they impose 'undue financial and administrative burdens"') (quoting Pottgen v.
Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 931 (8th CiTr 1994) (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17 (1987))).
220 Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.
221 Id.
222 Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897-1898.
22' Id. at 1898 n.53.
224 Id.
225 Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1203 (D. Or. 1999).
226 Shannon, supra note 3, at 95-96.
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4. Written Rules
The Supreme Court also noted that the potential undue burden associated
with making an individualized assessment of a disabled individual could be
abrogated by "strictly adhering to general rules and policies that are entirely fair
with respect to the able-bodied but that may indiscriminately preclude access by
qualified persons with disabilities.,
227
Several commentators have argued that this strict adherence would most
easily be upheld if these rules-for instance, golf's walking rule-were written
down in some sort of official rulebook for the particular sport. This use of
written rules "might be considered a lawyerly emphasis, or overemphasis,
inappropriate to sport. On the other hand, the rules are considered in the context
of evidence of intention, ongoing practice, and a general perception about what
is important about the game., 228 In essence,
[ilf an eligibility rule (which is written down) is enforced for legitimate reasons
(as in the high school cases), modifications of which would fundamentally alter
the game, the rule should be allowed. What is not allowed is nonessential rules or
traditions which bar a disabled individual from participating in golf if he or she
229
meets the other criteria established by the organization.
5. Athletics and the ADA
Many seem to presume that sports organizations should be exempt from the
ADA's requirements, "with the justification that sports are different from other
endeavors because of their elite nature, the purpose of which is to identify those
who are physically most accomplished., 230  As this author stated earlier,
however, although "sports organizations, even after the cases discussed herein,
are still loath to admit that the ADA does apply in the sports context... [tihe
ADA deals with organizations that come under its requirements and discriminate
against the disabled... sports organizations receive no special protection from
the strictures of the ADA."2 31 Other commentators have noted that
[fqirst, no such deference is provided to any organization or entity including sport
organizations. Second, the ADA does not exempt sport organizations. Had
Congress desired to exempt sport organizations it could have, and yet nothing in
the ADA, its history, or the amicus brief of ADA sponsors Senators Harkin, Dole,
227 Martin, 121 S. Ct at 1897.
228 Barnes, supra note 201, at 81.
229 Anderson, supra note 4, at 88 (emphasis in original).
230 Barnes, supra note 201, at 84.
231 Anderson, supra note 4, at 85, 87.
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and Kennedy, supports the existence of an exemption. Exemptions are not foreign
to Congress, as it exempted all professional sports leagues and the business of
professional baseball from the antitrust laws.
232
Although the cases discussed in this Article did not all come to the
conclusion that each sports organization was subject to the requirements of the
ADA, each court at least attempted to determine if the disabled plaintiff could
succeed on such a claim.
In the end, the Supreme Court made it very clear that sports organizations,
whether at the lowest or highest level of competition, are not exempt from the
requirements of the ADA, as the statute "carves out no exemption for elite
athletics, '233 regardless of the potential burden that a sports organization believes
ADA scrutiny might entail.
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE MARTINDECIsION
After the Martin decision, several courts have been faced with challenges by
disabled athletes. In following the rules and clarifications just discussed, the
following sampling of cases is illustrative of the exact way in which the Supreme
Court's decision has influenced judicial scrutiny of sports organizations.
A. Cruz v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association
234
Similar to plaintiffs in the interscholastic cases discussed earlier, Luis Cruz
is a learning disabled student-athlete who sued the Pennsylvania Interscholastic
Athletic Association ("PIAA") because it enforced its age limit rule which barred
him from participating in sports once he reached the age of nineteen. Cruz
claimed that the rule discriminated against him in violation of Title II of the
ADA.2 "
After recounting the conflicting decisions in Pottgen, Sandison, McPherson
and Washington, the court stated that it was waiting for the Supreme Court's
decision in the Martin case before resolving the present case.236 The court
immediately noted the Supreme Court's requirement that the focus be on the
disabled individual."' It distilled the Supreme Court's Martin decision down to
three inquiries: "(1) whether the requested modification is reasonable; (2)
232 Moorman & Masteralexis, supra note 6, at 306.
233 Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1896.
234 157 F. Supp. 2d 485 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
235 In analyzing this case, one must keep in mind the Bowers III court's explanation that a Title III
analysis is very similar to a Title 1I analysis under the ADA. Bowers 111, I18 F. Supp. 2d 494, 517
(D.N.J. 2000).
236 Cruz, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 496-98.
237 Id. at 498.
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whether it is necessary for the disabled individual; and (3) whether it would
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition."
238
In dealing with the last two inquiries, the court quickly found that "Cruz
would not fundamentally alter the nature of the competition in football and track
and that the modification of the age rule is necessary for him to be able to play in
interscholastic competition in those two sports. 239  It had more difficulty
determining whether the rule itself is reasonable.
According to the court, in assessing this reasonableness, it first had to
determine whether the rule is essential to the PIAA sports program. As the court
explained, "a rule is essential to a program unless it can be shown that the waiver
of it would not fundamentally alter the nature of the program., 240  After
completing the individualized assessment of Cruz's situation, "it is clear that
Luis Cruz playing on the football team and track team would not fundamentally
alter the nature of PIAA interscholastic competition. 24'
The court also addressed the potential burden that would be placed on the
PIAA to administer a waiver rule in connection with the age of the individual
seeking a waiver. After finding that the PIAA often grants waivers of its rules
and that the statistics showed that there were few occasions where similar age
waivers could be considered, the court held that "it does not appear that a waiver
process would place an unreasonable burden on the PIAA. 242
B. Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corp.243
This case involved Stephen Kuketz, a paraplegic bound to a wheelchair since
1991, and a nationally-ranked player in wheelchair racquetball competitions. In
1995 Kuketz sought to play in an "A" Level Tournament but asked that he be
permitted two bounces to hit the ball, rather than the one bounce given to all
players on foot. The tournament organizers would not make this
accommodation; instead they offered to allow him to play in a novice league
with footed players or to set up an actual wheelchair league if he could find other
wheelchair players. Because they would not provide his requested
accommodation, Kuketz sued the organizers, claiming that they discriminated
against him in violation of Title III of the ADA.
In analyzing Kuketz's claim, the Superior Court of Massachusets also began
by examining the Supreme Court's Martin decision. Following Martin, and
23 Id. at 499.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 500.
243 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 347 (S.C. Mass. Aug. 17, 2001).
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mirroring Criuz, this court also distilled the analysis down to three distinct issues:
(1) whether the requested modification is reasonable, (2) whether the
modification is necessary for the disabled individual, and (3) whether it would
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. 2 4
The court made clear that "given Kuketz's ability as a racquetball player, he
would be playing A League if he were not a paraplegic and could play on
foot. 245 Still, in order to participate at the A level, he needs to be given two
bounces, and he needs to stay in a wheelchair. Both of these factors
demonstrated that his requested modification was clearly "necessary" according
to the second factor. 2"
The organizers contested that the modification still was not reasonable
because it would pose a safety risk to other competitors to have one participant
in a wheelchair, and it would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition to
allow two bounces. Based on the record, the court could not measure the
reasonableness of the modification itself.247 All of the other competitors who
signed up for the league refused to play Kuketz, but the court could not assess
whether this was due to ignorance or actual safety concerns. Moreover,
testimony from supposed experts on racquetball were inconsistent as to whether
the proposed safety concerns were real.
The court turned to what it termed the central issue in the case: whether the
modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the competition. The court
again followed Martin and its recognition of two types of fundamental
alterations: (1) "a modification 'might alter such an essential aspect of the game
of golf that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors
equally' 24 and (2) "a less significant modification 'that has only a peripheral
impact on the game itself might nevertheless give a disabled player... an
advantage over others."'
249
The court looked at the Official Rules of Racquetball and found that they
required the ball to be returned on the first bounce. The rules promulgated for
wheelchair racquetball, while allowing for two bounces, also require that both
participants actually be in wheelchairs. The court also looked to the Supreme
Court's Martin analysis that while the essence of golf is hitting the ball, "how
one traveled to the ball was not." 250 Relying on its analysis of the rules and the
244 Id. at N4.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at *5.
248 Id. at *6 (citing Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1893).
249 Id.
210 Id. at *7.
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Martin decision, the court determined that "[w]hile the essence of golf is hitting
a stationary ball with a club, the essence of racquetball is hitting a moving ball
before the second bounce with a racquet. Allowing one player two bounces
fundamentally changes the nature of the game," 251 fitting in the Supreme Court's
first type of alteration in Martin. Moreover, "giving a wheelchair player two
bounces and a footed player one bounce is a variation on the Official Rules of
racquetball. The Club is certainly free to establish a league that plays this
variation of racquetball but it is not required by the ADA to do so.
' 252
The court also determined that the modification would still be unreasonable
if it only had a peripheral impact on the game, according to the second type of
alteration delineated in Martin. Even though the court could not make a factual
determination of this possibility, the modification of a two-bounce rule for a
disabled player might actually provide the disabled individual with an advantage
over other players. 253 "Stated differently, if Kuketz were allowed to compete in
the A League as he requests and were to become champion of the league, no one
could know whether he won because he was the superior player or because the
allowance of two bounces more than offset his disadvantage in mobility. 254
In the end, because Kuketz's requested modification would fundamentally
alter the nature of the racquetball competition, the ADA would not required the
organizers to change their rules.
C. Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
25
The facts of the Matthews case were discussed earlier in this Article.256
After its initial holding that the NCAA is not amenable to the requirements of
251 Id. at *7-8.
252 Id. at *8-9.
253 Id. at *9.
254 Id.
255 179 F.2d 1209 (E.D. Wash. 2001)- A similar case was decided in July 2001. In Pryor v. NVCAA,
153 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. Pa. 2001), a similar student athlete plaintiff could not meet the initial
eligibility requirements allegedly due to her disabled status. She sought a waiver from the rules and
was given partial qualifier status for her freshman year. Still, she sued the NCAA alleging that this
decision was illegal discrimination prohibited by the ADA.
The court did not reach the merits of Pryor's ADA claim because immediately before she entered
college, the NCAA instituted Bylaw 14.3.3.2, specifically granting learning disabled student-athletes
five years to use their four years of athletic eligibility. Noting the decision in Bowers IV, the court
determined that she could seek to win back the year of eligibility she missed due to her partial qualifier
status; therefore, the court granted the NCAA's motion to dismiss her ADA complaint. Pryor, 153 F.
Supp. 2d at 714-15.
256 See supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
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Title II of the ADA,51 the parties moved for summary judgment. Then "[b]ased
on the possibility that the Supreme Court's decision in the Martin case might
affect" this case, the court stayed the summary judgment hearing until the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Martin.258 The court also recognized that
"many cases have evaluated Title II of the ADA, including its application to
sports organizations generally and the NCAA specifically," and it used these
cases in its analysis.
259
In assessing whether Title III applies to the NCAA, the court first addressed
the definition of "public accommodation" under the ADA. The court followed
the Ninth Circuit, and implicitly the Sixth and Third Circuit, noting, "some
'nexus' must exist between the physical place of public accommodation and the
services or privileges denied in a discriminatory manner., 260 It then looked to
the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Martin.
Both of these decisions recognized that "control exerted over access to the
field of play can subject a private entity to ADA requirements. ' '2S 1 The Ninth
Circuit also provided strong evidence that it would hold that Title 111 applied to
the NCAA as it cited with approval the Ganden, Tatum, and Bowers 111
decisions, all of which held that the NCAA was covered by the ADA.262
Specifically, the court noted that the Ganden court's in depth look into issue of
whether the NCAA controlled access to the arenas used in competition, is the
exact type of broad inquiry the Supreme Court pointed to as necessary in
Martin. 263
The court also mentioned the Cole and Pryor decisions that implicitly
assumed that Title III covers the NCAA, and the Butler case, in which the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that the U.S. Department of Justice found that the NCAA
violated Title 1lI.2 64 Together these cases led the court to reconsider its prior
decision that the NCAA was not amenable to Title Il.
The NCAA argued that the member institutions control athletic activities,
and therefore, it is not an operator of a place of public accommodation covered
by Title III. In addressing this argument the court pointed to the Supreme
Court's decision in Martin which "made clear that the ADA applies not only to
entities governing spectators' access to a sports facility but also to those entities
27 Matthews 1, 79 F. Supp. 2d t 199, 1205-06 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
25 Matfhes , 179 F. Stupp. 2d at 1214,
259 
Id. at 1218.
"6 Id. at 1219.
161 Id. at 1220.
2 2 Id. at 1220-21.
263 Id. at 1221.
"6 Id. at 1221-22,
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governing athletes' access to the competition itself. 265 The NCAA controls
which students may participate in athletics, thereby creating a "sufficient nexus
with actual places to subject the association to the ADA., 266 In the end,
[tihe Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court analysis in the Martin case requires this
Court to acknowledge that control over an athletic playing field does subject a
private entity to Title Ill of the ADA. Recent decisions from courts in other
circuits also support this finding. When considering the recent change in the law,
in light of the record submitted in the instant case, the Court finds that Title III of
the ADA does apply to the NCAA, based upon the large degree of control the
NCAA exerts over which students may access the arena of competitive college
football.
267
After finding that Title III applies to the NCAA, the court moved to an
analysis of whether the plaintiffis proposed modification of the NCAA's rules
would fundamentally alter the nature of NCAA athletics. The court initially
noted that according to the Supreme Court's decision in Martin, this analysis
must "focus on the individual and may not generally evaluate whether a blanket
waiver of a requirement would constitute a fundamental alteration."26 As with
the previous cases just discussed, it also noted that the Supreme Court
recognized that fundamental alterations could be modifications that either affect
an essential aspect that would be unacceptable even if all competitors were
affected equally, or minor changes that somehow provide the disabled individual
with an advantage.
The Cole and Bowers III courts found that requested waivers were
fundamental alterations because one plaintiff's scores were so low that he never
would have met the NCAA's eligibility requirements, while another sought to be
269
exempted completely from the NCAA's individualized waiver review process.
In analyzing Matthews' particular situation, the court disagreed with its earlier
decision (as the Bowers III court had done)270 and emphasized that in the other
cases mentioned, the NCAA had never granted the requested waiver, while in
this case the NCAA had already given Matthews two waivers from its rules. In
the end, it was "difficult, particularly in light of the individualized inquiry
required by Martin, to see how granting a third waiver to Plaintiff would
26 Id. at 1223.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 ld- at 1225.
269 Id. at 1225-26
270 Bowers 111, 118 F. Supp. 2d 494, 516-17 (D.N.J. 2000).
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fundamentally alter the NCAA's purpose, when the first two waivers did not.,
27
Therefore, following the Martin decision closely, the court found that
although doing away with the NCAA's academic eligibility requirements would
be a fundamental alteration, waiving the particular rule contested in this case (the
75/25 rule), even for all athletes, "would not alter an essential aspect of the
NCAA's purpose to promote academics and athleticism. 272 In addition, the
court found that Matthews would not gain any advantage; he would simply be
given a "modification that would permit [him] access to competitive college
football at WSU while he pursues his degree in an academic program tailored to
his learning disability.
273
D. The Sports World After Martin
These initial cases demonstrate that the outlandish results predicted by many
after the Supreme Court decided Martin are not occurring. The cases that have
followed Martin have simply refined the analysis that was already there.
As these cases demonstrate, the Supreme Court's decision in Martin distilled
the analysis down to a test of three factors: (1) whether the requested
modification is reasonable; (2) whether it is necessary for the disabled
individual; and (3) whether it would fundamentally alter the nature of the
competition. In testing these factors the analysis must include an individualized
assessment of the disabled individual involved and how the requested
modification he individually proposes will affect the particular sport. Finally,
the third factor will be met either if the modification alters an essential aspect of
the particular sport so that it would be unacceptable to allow it even if it equally
affects all competitors, or if the modification is less significant and only has a
peripheral impact on the game itself but still gives the disabled individual an
advantage over others.
In the interscholastic and intercollegiate cases such as Bingham,
Washington, and Bowers 111, courts were already making the necessary type of
individualized assessment of the disabled student-athletes involved. The Martin
decision merely clarifies that this assessment must be part of the process. These
courts had also all analyzed whether a waiver of certain eligibility rules would
fundamentally alter the nature of the athletic programs themselves; Martin
merely adds to this analysis by delineating two tests for assessing whether this
type of alteration has occurred. The fact-intensive nature of the analysis has not
changed; rather, the focus on the individual disabled athlete and the test for
271 Matthews I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1226.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 1227.
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understanding what would be a fundamental alteration has merely been clarified.
The recent cases also demonstrate that the results may not really have
changed that much. Before Martin, the four cases discussed at the
interscholastic level had reached different results. After making an
individualized assessment, the Bingham and Washington courts determined that
waivers of the eligibility rules involved would not fundamentally alter the nature
of the sports programs offered. Oddly enough, the Stearns and Long cases both
pointed to the Washington case as they reached different results. The difference
seems to be that they did not undertake the individualized assessment required
under the ADA and clarified in Martin. The recent Cruz case followed the
Supreme Court's mandate in Martin and undertook this individualized
assessment in coming to the same result as the Bingham and Washington courts.
Clearly the Supreme Court's clarification of the ADA's requirements did not
cause the Cruz court to reach some unexpected result.
The intercollegiate cases are even less complicated. The best example can
be found in the series of decisions in the Matthews case. In the initial decision in
Matthews, the court held that the NCAA was not a public accommodation
covered by Title III of the ADA. Most telling, the court also noted that the
NCAA had already granted Matthews two waivers of its rules, and somehow a
third waiver would be a fundamental alteration not mandated under the ADA.
This specious reasoning was clarified after the Martin decision.
In its second look at the issues, the same court followed the Supreme Court's
directive to undertake an individualized inquiry of the disabled claimant and
reasoned that if the NCAA had already granted two waivers, it could not then
claim that granting a third waiver to the same individual would somehow
fundamentally alter its rules. The court made clear that if the NCAA had never
granted the waivers in the first place its decision might have changed.
The court also changed its mind about the nature of the NCAA under the
ADA. In following Martin and earlier intercollegiate cases such as Tatum,
Ganden, and Bowers III, the court easily determined that the NCAA was a public
accommodation covered under Title 1II. This determination was nothing new
was not dictated by the Supreme Court's decision in Martin. Instead, the Martin
case merely clarified what many courts had been hinting at before: The NCAA's
control over an operation of intercollegiate athletics, much like the PGA Tour's
control and operation of golf tournaments, brings the NCAA under the purview
of the ADA.
CONCLUSION
Can participants in sports expect that the sports they know and love will be
significantly different because of the Martin decision? The answer is yes and no.
254
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If a sports organization does not allow for "reasonable" modifications of its rules
for disabled athletes when such modifications will not change the fundamental
nature of the sport itself, the organization can expect to be forced to undertake
the modification by judicial mandate.
Yet, this result is not so outrageous or burdensome as to change the nature of
sport itself. The Kuketz court made clear that the fear that this will happen is
unjustified:
It is worthwhile to reflect upon what the sporting world would look like if the
ADA were interpreted as Kuketz [the wheelchair racquetball player] proposes. In
baseball, if a hitter in a wheelchair came to the plate, the ADA would require first
base to be moved closer to home plate so that the hitter could reach first base in
roughly the time it would take a footed player to run ninety feet. In golf
tournaments, the ADA would require 'wheelchair tees' closer to the hole to
compensate for the shorter distances that wheelchair golfers can generally hit their
tee shot. In basketball, the ADA would require that wheelchair teams competing
against footed teams be given a shorter basket to compensate for their greater
difficulty in shooting a basketball without the use of their legs. It may be terrific
for leagues and clubs to provide these opportunities so that wheelchair players
can compete meaningfully against footed players, but the ADA does not require
them to depart from the official rules whenever a wheelchair player or team wants
to play a footed player or team. The law permits leagues and clubs to organize
baseball, golf and basketball leagues that play their respective games in
accordance with the game's official rules without running afoul of the ADA.274
Still, many in the sports world seem to have double vision. Although Casey
Martin has not been provided assistance that unfairly tilts the course in his favor,
"observers see only that he has received some benefit not given to others. This
double vision of the nature of the accommodation-objectionable in principle
though it allows participation-reminds us that the ADA is a civil rights statute
that prohibits the continuation of discrimination against an identifiable group.,
275
Casey Martin did not ask to have a disability that does not allow him to walk
for great distances, just as the learning disabled students in high school or
college did not ask to have to take special education courses or to be held back in
school as a result of their disability. They merely ask that they be allowed to
participate in a meaningful way at something they are qualified to do. They also
ask that some peripheral aspect of the sport itself be changed because otherwise
they cannot participate. The perception that providing any type of
214 Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corp., 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 347 (S.C. Mass. Aug. 17, 2001), at *9-11
(emphasis added).
275 Barnes, supra note 201, at 88.
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accommodation at all for these individuals necessarily gives them a competitive
advantage is uninformed and misguided.
It seems that the perception of those that do not wish to allow disabled
individuals to participate in sports with able-bodied individuals unless they can
meet what are presumed to be the requirements of the sport itself is really a
misunderstanding of the nature of sport. As one commentator stated, "[t]he
Court clearly rejects the idea that identifying the healthiest, strongest and
generally most capable competitor is the purpose of any specific sport. Rather,
the sport is likely to be defined by its existing rules in order to identify by
competition the person most capable at the specific activities fundamental to that
sport.,
276
If sport is truly an endeavor to allow the most capable person to succeed at
the sport's particular activities, the Martin case and the other cases assessing the
impact of the ADA on sport have merely implemented this goal. They have
allowed those individuals that are gifted sports competitors despite their
disabilities to participate. With this in mind, sport truly can exhibit the
characteristics of athletic achievement, fair play, and the inclusive nature it
should exemplify.
276 Id. at 13-14.
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